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The Scope and Limits of the Inheritance Defense
in CERCLA
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of a new Presidency brings with it the possibility of
dramatic change in the context of environmental regulation. In-
deed, Vice President Al Gore is an ardent supporter of a compre-
hensive cleaning up of the environment. As most Americans real-
ize, corporations will likely be hard hit with the strengthening of
environmental regulations. Yet, as many may be unaware, even in-
dividual landowners not involved in corporate affairs, may be po-
tential targets for liability under environmental statutes.
For instance, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)1, its corresponding
regulations,2 and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA) s allow the government to seek costs for cleaning up
the environment from the "current owner" or "current operator"
of a contaminated land site. Assume, for instance, that taxpayer A
has inherited property which, although unused now, was formerly
used as a municipal solid waste disposal facility. Assume further
that the taxpayer was not involved with the company, nor did he
or she own the land during any period of contamination. A cursory
examination of the land disclosed no sign of leachate4 or contami-
nation. Theoretically, under Superfund 5 provisions, A taxpayer
could nonetheless be targeted for cleanup costs as a current
owner.
6
1. 42 USC § 9601 et seq (1980).
2. 40 CFR §§ 300, 304 (1992).
3. 42 USC § 9601 et seq (1986).
4. "Leachate" is defined as "the liquid that has percolated through soil or other
medium." Webster's Third International Dictionary 1282 (Merriam-Webster 1986).
5. "Superfund" is the popular name for CERCLA. "The name derives from a trust
fund initially created by the Act for meeting clean up costs pending reimbursement from
responsible parties." Black's Law Dictionary 1437 (West, 6th ed 1990).
6. 42 USC § 9607(a)(1).
The issue of what does or does not qualify as a "facility" is beyond the scope of this
comment. Consequently, this comment is based upon the assumption that A's land
would qualify as a "facility" under the statute. Section 9607(a)(1) targets the "owner
or operator of a vessel or a facility" with liability. 42 USC § 9607(a)(1). "Facility is
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Some might think this an unjust result, and indeed, Superfund
does provide a means of escaping such liability - the "inheritance
defense."17 Essentially, the statute provides that those obtaining
land through inheritance or bequest should, subject to certain re-
quirements, not be held responsible for the payment of cleanup
costs.' Precisely what those requirements consist of, however, is
difficult to discern. Inconsistencies and contradictions as to those
requirements exist between the statutory language, the legislative
history and various secondary sources. Moreover, those federal
cases addressing the "inheritance defense" do so only tangentially
and thus offer no substantial guidance as to interpreting the
defense.'
Given this apparent labyrinth regarding the statute, how is one
in taxpayer A's situation to assess his or her responsibilities con-
cerning cleanup? This comment seeks to explore the language of
the statute, the legislative history, secondary sources and applica-
ble case law in hopes of providing some guidance for those, such as
taxpayer A, seeking shelter from liability within the parameters of
the inheritance defense.
II. STATUTE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Statute
In 1976, Congress gave the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) authority to regulate the chemical contamination of
homes.' 0 Yet it was largely due to contamination of homes in the
Love Canal area of Niagra Falls, New York in 1978 which brought
environmental regulation to the forefront of American conscious-
ness and which encouraged the EPA to accelerate such regula-
tions." Consequently, it was in 1980 when Congress passed Public
Law 96-510 - the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).' 2 CERCLA authorized
defined as follows:
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed
of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer
product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 USC § 9601(9)(B).
7. 42 USC § 9607(b). See note 22 and accompanying text.
8. See note 22 and accompanying text.
9. See note 80 and accompanying text.
10. Wallis E. McClain, Jr., ed, U.S. Environmental Laws 4-1 (BNA 1991).




$1.6 billion to finance the cleanup of both the Love Canal area and
other abandoned dumpsites.
13
Although there was a consensus that CERCLA presented the
EPA with a powerful tool, many were concerned with the relatively
low number of completed cleanups. 4 As a consequence, Congress
passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) of 198615 which essentially increased the money in the
original fund from $1.6 billion to $8.5 billion over five years.",
SARA did not drastically alter the 1980 Act's basic concept of lia-
bility. For instance, if the government can establish a link to a
superfund site it may still recover cleanup costs from a potentially
responsible party (PRP).17
One of the PRPs is the "current owner or operator" of the facil-
ity." Yet, although SARA was designed to increase the completion
of cleanup sites, it also created a new defense to liability-the "In-
nocent Landowner" defense. 9 The defense was created, not by al-
tering the list of defenses in section 9607(b) of the statute, but
rather by redefining a term used in that section.20 The altering of
the defense in this indirect manner may seem curious, but "[t]he
placement of the provision in [s]ection 101, 42 U.S.C. section 9601
[the "definitions" section, rather than in the "liability" section]
emphasizes that the Conference did not anticipate that the defense
would be regularly utilized by potentially responsible parties as a
defense to liability.
2 1
As noted above, the actual wording of the "defenses" section was
not amended. The applicable text reads as follows:
(b) Defenses
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the release or threat of release of a, hazardous substance and the damage
resulting therefrom were caused solely by
13. McClain, Laws at 4-2 (cited in note 10).
14. Id.
15. See note 3 and accompanying text.
16. McClain, Laws at 4-2 (cited in note 10).
17. Id.
18. 42 USC § 9607(a)(1).
19. 42 USC § 9607(b).
20. 42 USC § 9601(35)(A)(iii).
21. James M. Strock, The Genesis of the 'Innocent Landowner' Defense, Toxic L
Rep, 590, 594 (BNA Oct 5, 1988).
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(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with
a CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP, existing directly or indirectly if the de-
fendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised
due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took all precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences
that could foreseeably result from such acts of omissions .... 22
The expansion of the available defenses, per SARA, to include
those landowners acquiring land through inheritance or bequest
was achieved by redefining the phrase "contractual relationship."
This new definition reads as follows:
(35)(A) The term "CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP," for the purpose of section
9607(b)(3) of this title includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds
or other instruments transferring title or possession unless the real property
on which the facility concerned is located was acquired by the defendant
after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the
facility, and one or more of the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii) OR
(iii) is also established by a preponderance of the evidence:
(iii) THE DEFENDANT ACQUIRED THE FACILITY BY INHERITANCE OR BEQUEST.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish
that he has satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of
this title. 2
The limitations upon invoking this defense are found both within
the "liability" section (cited above) and within the "definitions"
section which reads as follows:
(C) Nothing in this paragraph or 9607(b)(3) of this title shall diminish the
liability of any previous owner or operator of such facility who would other-
wise be liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the
defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of
a hazardous substance at such facility when the defendant owned the real
property and then subsequently transferred ownership of the property to
another person without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be
treated as liable under section 9607(a)(1) of this title and no defense under
section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall be available to the defendant.
(D) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the liability under this chapter of
a defendant who, by any act or omission. caused or contributed to the re-
22. 42 USC § 9607(b) (1983) (emphasis added).
23. 42 USC § 9601(35)(A).
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lease or threatened release of a hazardous substance which is the subject of
the action relating to the facility.24
Thus, a mere reading of the statutory text, in and of itself, pro-
vides some guidance as to the parameters of the inheritance de-
fense. According to the foregoing sections, the landowner must es-
tablish by a preponderance of evidence that he acquired the
facility AFTER the disposal or release occurred; that he exercised
due care with respect to the hazardous substance when he ulti-
mately did obtain knowledge of the release or threatened release;
and that he took precautions against the foreseeable acts or omis-
sions of third parties. However, even if the landowner were to meet
the above mentioned requirements, the defense would nevertheless
be unavailable if the landowner learned of the release or
threatened release and failed to disclose such knowledge to a sub-
sequent purchaser, or if he or she contributed to the release or
threatened release.
B. Legislative History
Although the text of the statute appears to be straightforward, a
reading of the legislative history reveals nuances and distinctions
not evident in the text itself.2" As to "Landowner Liability," it is
reported that the House proposed an amendment which would
have eliminated liability for those landowners who acquired title
after the release of hazardous substances, and who, although they
had exercised due care with respect to discovering such materials,
were nonetheless ignorant of their presence.2 The Senate Amend-
ment contained no comparable provision.2
The Conference Committee (Committee) rejected the House's
proposal, and substituted its own amendment - the current lan-
guage of the statute parallels that of the Committee's amendment.
The Committee's amendment added the new term "contractual re-
lationship" to the definitions section. 8 The definition "clarified"
and "confirmed" that landowners who acquire contaminated prop-
erty without knowing, or without reason to know, of the contami-
nation may have a defense to liability if they satisfy the remaining
24. 42 USC § .9601(35)(D).
25. Superfund Amendments of 1986, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, reprinted in 1986
USCCAN 2835, 3279-81 ("1986 USCCAN").
26. 1986 USCCAN at 3279-81 (cited in note 25).
27. Id.
28. Id at 3279.
1993 Comments 823
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requirements of section 9607(b)(3)."
As stated above, the text of section 9607(b)(3) mandates that the
defendant exercise due care with respect to the hazardous sub-
stance and that he take precautions against the foreseeable acts of
third parties.3 0 As to these requirements, the Committee stated
that:
the due care requirement embodied in section [9607(b)(3)] only requires
such person to exercise that degree of due care which is reasonable under
the circumstances. The requirement would include those steps necessary to
protect the public from a health or environmental threat. . . . Foreseeabil-
ity [as to the acts of third parties] must be considered in light of the specific
circumstances of each case. 1
At this point, the Committee's commentary appears to be consis-
tent with the text of the statute."2
Discrepancies between the Committee's amendment and the text
of the statute do arise, however, in another context. As stated
above, the Committee would recognize the defense for those who
acquire the property "without knowing of the contamination at the
site and without reason of know of any contamination."33 The
Committee also suggested that there will be a duty to inquire, ap-
parently as to the possible contaminated "status" of the land. 4
The Committee conceded that the duty to inquire would be judged
as of the time of acquisition and that the landowner would be held
to a higher standard as public awareness associated with hazardous
substance releases grew.3 5 In terms of ascertaining what a "reason-
able inquiry" is, the Committee declared that:
[t]hose engaged in commercial transactions should ... be held to a higher
standard than those who are engaged in private residential transactions.
Similarly, those who acquire property through inheritance or bequest with-
out any actual knowledge may rely upon this section if they engage in a
reasonable inquiry, but they need not be held to the same standard as those
who acquire property as part of a commercial or private transaction, and
those who acquire property by inheritance without knowing of the inheri-
tance shall not be liable, if they satisfy the remaining requirements of sec-
tion 107(b)(3).3 1
29. Id.
30. 42 USC § 9607(b)(3).
31. 1986 USCCAN at 3280 (cited in note 25).
32. 42 USC § 9607(b)(3).
33. 1986 USCCAN at 3279 (cited in note 25).
34. Id at 3280.
35. Id at 3279.
36. Id at 3280-81.
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Thus, according to the Committee, even those who acquire prop-
erty through inheritance must make a reasonable inquiry as to the
possible contamination of the land. 7
Support for the imposition of this duty is not found in a strict
reading of the statute. The statute does require the making of a
"reasonable inquiry," but does so in a provision separate from that
of inheritance.3 8 The statute imposes no requirements upon the in-
heritance defense other than that the landowner must have ac-
quired the property after the contamination occurred and, accord-
ing to section 9607(b)(3), that the landowner exercise due care with
respect to the hazardous substances, and that he or she take pre-
cautions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of third parties.
Without a requirement that the landowner neither "know nor have
reason to know," it appears inconsistent to neverthless hold a land-
owner to a duty of inquiry as to the status of the land. Thus, the
legislative history's suggested imposition of a duty to make a "rea-
sonable inquiry" is in direct contradiction to the wording of the
statute. Curiously, although the Committee would seemingly im-
pose this duty upon those obtaining land through a commercial or
private transaction as well as upon those acquiring land through
inheritance or bequest, it did not impose this duty upon the only
remaining category of landowners referred to in the statute-the
government acquiring land through escheat et cetera. The Com-
mittee's notes fail to explain this discrepancy.40
37. Id.
38. "The term 'contractual relationship,' for the purpose of section 9607(b)(3) of this
title includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring
title or possession unless the real property on which the facility concerned is located was
acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in
or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), OR (iii) is
also established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) AT THE TIME THE DEFENDANT ACQUIRED THE FACILITY THE DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW
AND HAD NO REASON TO KNOW THAT ANY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF
THE RELEASE OR THREATENED RELEASE WAS DISPOSED OF ON, IN OR AT THE FACILITY.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by escheat, or
though any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of emi-
nent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) THE DEFENDANT ACQUIRED THE FACILITY BY INHERITANCE OF BEQUEST.
42 USC § 9601(35)(A)(emphasis added).
39. 1986 USCCAN at 3279 (cited in note 25). One may reach this conclusion through
negative implication because although the Committee discusses the applicable standards for
conducting an "appropriate inquiry," it does so only in the context of those acquiring land
through commercial or private transactions, and inheritance or bequest, and makes no men-




The legislative history also differs from the statutory text in that
it makes distinctions between and among those obtaining land
through inheritance or bequest. The Committee's report states, in
one instance, that "those who acquire property through inheritance
or bequest WITHOUT ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE may rely upon this section
if they engage in a reasonable inquiry," yet in another instance
notes that "those who acquire property by inheritance WITHOUT
KNOWING OF THE INHERITANCE shall not be liable, if they satisfy the
remaining requirements of" section 9607(b)(3).4!
Read with the assumption that all landowners acquiring land in
this manner would be held to the same requirements for the invok.
ing of the defense, it appears that the Committee is inconsistent in
terms of exactly what requirements are imposed. The first refer-
ence to "knowledge" incorporates the duty to make a "reasonable
inquiry." 2 The second reference to "knowledge" makes no men-
tion of the duty to make a reasonable inquiry, and rather requires
the landowner to merely exercise due caution upon discovering the
hazardous substance, and to take precautions against the foresee-
able acts and omissions of third parties.43
This apparent contradiction may, however, be eliminated if .the
reference to "knowledge" is interpreted as meaning different
things in each phrase. As to the first reference, "without knowl-
edge" may refer to knowledge of the release or threatened release
of hazardous substances (i.e.-contamination), knowledge of which
could be obtained through conducting a "reasonable inquiry," as to
the possible release of such substances." Thus, "without knowl-
edge" in this instance, appears to be a reference to the status of
the land in terms of contamination. Presumably, based upon the
language of the statute, this landowner would also have to meet
the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)-exercising due care and
taking precautions against the foreseeable acts of third parties.4 5
As to the second reference, the text explicitly states that "those
who acquire property by inheritance WITHOUT KNOWING OF THE IN-
HERITANCE shall not be liable, if they satisfy the remaining require-
ments" of section 9607(b)(3)."' Thus, unlike the first reference,
where "knowledge" referred to "contamination," in this phrase
41. 1986 USCCAN at 3280-81 (emphasis added) (cited in note 25).
42. See note 36 and accompanying text.
43. 1986 USCCAN at 3280-81 (cited in note 25).
44. Id at 3280.
45. 42 USC § 9607(b)(3).
46. 1986 USCCAN at 3280-81 (emphasis added)(cited in note 25).
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"knowledge" seemingly refers to "inheritance." Apparently, one
who is without knowledge of inheritance is only required to exer-
cise due care and to take precautions against foreseeable acts of
third parties-one is not required to make reasonable inquiry into
the possible existence of contamination."7 Those requirements im-
posed must presumably be complied with when the landowner ulti-
mately learns of the inheritance or bequest. 8
The reason for making a distinction between such landowners is
not provided in the Committee's amendment. However, one might
conclude that the distinction is neither arbitrary, nor a mistake.
The Committee amendment states that the defense is to be
granted to those landowners "who acquire property without know-
ing of any contamination at the site and without reason to know of
any contamination" 49-the implication perhaps being that the
landowner must be ignorant of the contamination at the time that
he is aware that he has ACQUIRED the property. This is consistent
with the first phrase-requiring those who had knowledge of their
inheritance to make a reasonable inquiry as to the status of the
land at the time of inheritance.5 Presumably, if such inquiries
were made and contamination discovered, the person may be able
to disclaim the property and thereby avoid liability. Seemingly, a
lesser duty/burden is imposed upon those landowners who were
without knowledge of inheritance.5 Such landowners would have
no notice of their inheritance and thus would have no reason to
inquire as to the possibility of contamination. Moreover, they
might not be afforded the luxury of disclaiming the property if a
reasonable inquiry did reveal contamination. Consequently, those
landowners ignorant of their very inheritance must only meet the
requirements of section 9607(b)(3)-presumably when they ulti-
mately learn of their inheritance.2
In summary, the Committee's amendment would have required
those landowners who have knowledge of their inheritance or be-
quest to make a reasonable inquiry as to the possible contamina-
tion of the land.5 3 This duty, which is not supported by the statute
47. It may be difficult to conceptualize a situation in which one is unaware of an
inheritance or bequest-nevertheless, this seems to be a reasonable construction of the legis-
lative history.
48. 1986 USCCAN at 3280-81 (cited in note 25).
49. Id at 3279.
50. See note 44 and accompanying text.
51. See note 46 and accompanying text.
52. 1986 USCCAN at 3280-81 (cited in note 25).
53. See note 45 and accompanying text.
1993
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itself, would be in addition to those statutory mandates-that the
landowner exercise due care in regards to the hazardous substance,
and that he take precautions against the foreseeable acts or omis-
sions or third parties. 4 In contrast, according to the Committee, a
landowner who is ignorant of the inheritance or bequest would
only be held to comply with these latter requirements and would
be under no duty to make a reasonable inquiry as to the status of
the land.
55
Although the legislative history appears to contradict the statute
in terms of the "scope" of the defense, it is consistent with the
statute in terms of the "limits" of the defense. 5 The Committee
noted that the definition of "contractual relationship" still allows
for liability in certain circumstances. For instance, if a person with
knowledge of the release or threatened release transfers property
without disclosing such information to the purchaser, then the de-
fense is lost.57 Moreover, the Committee stated that mere disclos-
ure of contamination would not entitle the party to a defense. if the
party would otherwise be liable (i.e.-contributed to the contami-
nation).5 8 There appears to be no discrepancy between the statu-
tory reading of the limits of the defense and the legislative his-
tory's treatment of the limits.
III. SECONDARY AUTHORITY
A. Scope of the Defense
As there are apparently discrepancies between the statutory lan-
guage itself and the legislative history, one might turn to secondary
authorities for a resolution of these issues. As previously stated,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the administrative
agency designated to enforce CERCLA and Superfund, and it
therefore follows that the EPA's interpretation of the inheritance
defense may be particularly insightful. A potential source of such
information are "Guidance Reports"-statements which are
designed to inform the public of the EPA's policy and position on
a particular environmental question. Unfortunately, the EPA has
not issued a Guidance Report on the inheritance defense in partic-
ular, or on "contractual relationships" in general. However, a
54. See note 45 and accompanying text.
55. See note 46 and accompanying text.
56. 1986 USCCAN at 3279-80 (cited in note 25).




Guidance Report was issued on "de minimis settlements."59
Within this Report the EPA stated that:
[t]he requirements which must be satisfied in order for the Agency to con-
sider a settlement with landowners under the de minimis settlement provi-
sions of Section 122(g)(1)(B) are substantially the same as the elements
which must be proved at trial in order to establish a third party defense
under Section 107(b)(3) and Section 101(35).'
Given the EPA's characterization of the de minimis provision as
substantially similar to the inheritance defense provision, the
Guidance Report on "de minimis settlements" may arguably thus
be used as a guideline in determining the scope and limits of the
inheritance defense.
The Guidance Report addressed section 101(35)(A)(iii) and
quoted the Conference Committee Report's passage referring to
that section. 1 The EPA noted that although section 101(35)(A) re-
moved acquisitions by inheritance or bequest from the definition
of "contractual relationship," the Conference Committee report
nevertheless "suggests that the 'all appropriate inquiry' require-
ment is nonetheless relevant."6 This statement intimates that the
EPA also found this to be an extra-statutory requirement. How-
ever, rather than criticizing such an addition, the EPA instead ap-
parently adopted this construction. The EPA stated that:
It is recommended that inquiry by the heir at the time of acquisition and
thereafter be considered, not only for the purpose of determining the exis-
tence of a contractual relationship, but also for the purpose of determining
whether the due care requirements of the third party defense have been
satisfied."'
Although the EPA endorsed the "reasonable inquiry" require-
ment, it did not make any reference to the distinctions made in the
Committee's report (as discussed above) among heirs-those with-
out knowledge of contamination and those without knowledge of
inheritance. Thus, the EPA Guidance Report failed, in some in-
59. The authorization of de minimis settlements is in regards to "parties who may be
able to 'buy' their way out of the cleanup process because of their limited involvement. The
idea is to facilitate the settlement process and also to use the revenues gained from the de
minimis parties to entice other PRPs to settle." McClain, Laws at 4-3 (cited in note 10).
60. Edward E. Reich, EPA Guidance of Landowner Liability Under Section
170(a)(1) and De Minimis Settlements Under Section 122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA, and Set-
tlements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property, Environment Reporter -
Federal Laws/Index 31:5371 (June 6, 1989).





stances, to reconcile or explain the differences between the statute
and the legislative history.4 Yet the Report does make clear that
the EPA would require all landowners obtaining land through in-
heritance or bequest to conduct a reasonable inquiry as to the sta-
tus of the land. 5
The inheritance defense was also addressed by another commen-
tator who noted that:
* . . parties acquiring property through inheritance or bequest will not be
liable, although the EPA has read into the statute a responsibility on the
part of the inheritor to inquire as to the status of the property at the time
of the acquisition. No such requirement is apparent in the statute, but there
is legislative history to support the agency's position.6
Leifer recognized that the duty to make a reasonable inquiry at the
time of acquisition was not reflected in the statute, yet he rational-
ized this additional requirement based upon the legislative his-
tory. 7 Leifer also noted that in addition to making a reasonable
inquiry, the landowner "must still exercise due care in his manage-
ment of the property" in order to avail himself of the defense.8
This reference appeared to be in regards to section
9607(b)(3)-which is mandated by statute.6 9
Other secondary sources which discussed "contractual relation-
ships" did so in general terms and did not focus specifically upon
the inheritance defense. For example, in a BNA Toxics Law Daily
Special Report, it was noted that:
Innocence is not a defense. However, a property owner has a defense if the
release and damage were caused solely by someone else with whom the
property owner did not have a contractual relationship and the property
owner took precautions to discover the problem and how to avoid the prob-
lem. A purchaser will not have a contractual relationship with his seller if
the release took place before the sale and the purchaser did not know or
have reason to know of the contamination. Finally, to prove that he did not
have a reason to know, the purchaser must engage in "appropriate
inquiry.1
70
The secondary sources, including the EPA Guidance Report,
64. See note 24 and accompanying text.
65. Reich, EPA Guidance at 31:5375 (cited in note 60).
66. Steven L. Leifer, EPA's Innocent Landowner Policy: A Practical Approach to
Liability Under Superfund, 20 Envir Rptr 646, 647 (BNA Aug 4, 1989).
67. Leifer, 20 Envir Rptr at 647 (cited in note 66).
68. Id.
69. 42 USC § 9607(b)(3).
70. Aaron Gershonowitz and Miguel Padilla, Superfund's Innocent Landowner De-
fense: Elusive of Illusory?, Toxics L Daily Special Report (BNA Oct 28, 1991).
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therefore reaffirm the general thrust of the legislative history-that
is, in addition to meeting the statutory requirements, heirs will
also be required to make a reasonable inquiry into the status of the
land upon acquisition of the property.
B. Limitations of the Defense
In terms of limitations to the defense, the sources parallel the
statute as well as the legislative history. For instance, "an innocent
purchaser who discovers a problem and inadvertently contributes
to it, loses the defense."7 " Additionally, "permitting the problem to
continue or failing to respond adequately can also destroy the de-
fense."72 Furthermore, "[m]inute quantities of waste, the failure to
quickly respond to an unforeseen problem, or the mere fact of hav-
ing disposed of waste years ago may all prevent a third party from
being the sole cause."7 3 "[P]revious owners who learned of releases
on site and transferred ownership without disclosing such informa-
tion to subsequent purchasers- are now fully liable under Section
107(a)(1), and are explicitly barred from asserting a third-party de-
fense to cleanup liability. ' '7" Given the consistent treatment of the
limitations on the defense by the statutory text, the legislative his-
tory, and the secondary sources, the landowner seems to be af-
forded reasonable notice of what actions may deprive him or her
from invoking the defense.
C. "Reasonable Inquiry"
Given that the secondary sources would impose a duty of inquiry
upon a party obtaining land through inheritance, one must ascer-
tain what constitutes a "reasonable inquiry." Representative Curt
Weldon (R-Pa.) proposed a bill which would have amended section
101(35) by adding a new subsection (C). 75 That subsection would
have established, in favor of the landowner, a rebuttable presump-
tion that the landowner has made all appropriate inquiry within
the meaning of subsection (B) if that landowner conducted a
"Phase I" environmental audit prior to or at the time of acquisi-
71. Gershonowitz, Innocent Landowner Defense, Toxics L Daily Special Rep at 12
(cited in note 70). (This publication contains no page numbers, consequently, the specific
paragraphs containing the information were cited for ease of reference).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. David J. Hayes and Conrad B. MacKerron, Superfund II: A New Mandate, Envir
Rptr, Special Rep (BNA 1987).
75. Leifer, 20 Envir Rptr at 647 n 8 (cited in note 66).
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tion of the property.7"
Theoretically, Weldon's proposal should have no impact upon
the inheritance defense, as subsection B, which focused on the
"reasonable inquiry" requirement, technically does not apply to
the inheritance provision.7 Under a strict reading of the statute,
an heir is not compelled to make a "reasonable inquiry."" Yet,
given that the legislative history, the EPA and other secondary
sources would obligate such a landowner to make a reasonable in-
quiry, a Phase I audit would feasibly be mandated.79
IV. CASE LAW
A thorough search of court cases and administrative decisions
disclosed very few cases which addressed the inheritance defense.
Moreover, even those cases that did address the provision failed to
clarify its scope or limits. The decision rendered in United States
v Pacific Hide & Fur Depot"0 discussed the provision at length, yet
even this decision was vague, unclear and largely unhelpful."s
In this action, the United States brought suit against three com-
panies and seven individuals to recover costs incurred in cleaning
up a recycling yard contaminated with polycholrinated biphenyls
(PCBs).2 The government sought to impose liability upon the in-
dividual defendants under two distinct theories; (1) as the current
76. Richard H. Mays, The Blessed State of Innocence: The Innocent Landowner
Defense Under Superfund 20 Envir Rptr 809 (Sept 8, 1989).
77. The applicable section of the statute reads as follows:
(35)(B)To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause
(i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at
the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses
of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to
minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into
account any specialized knowledge of experience on the part of the defendant, the
relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated,
commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the ob-
viousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the
ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
42 USC § 9601(35)(B).
78. 42 USC § 9601(35)(A)(iii).
79. A Phase I assessment consists of a review of the prior uses of the property; a
review of the government records regarding both the ownership and the use of the property;
a review of environmental compliance by owners and operators of the property; and an ex-
amination of the property itself-to look for sources of contamination or any evidence that
further investigation is needed. Gershonowitz, Innocent Landowner Defense, Toxics L Daily
Special Rep at 22 (cited in note 70).
80. 716 F Supp 1341 (D Idaho 1989).
81. Pacific Hide, 716 F Supp at 1341.
82. Id.
Comments
owners/operators of the facility; and (2) as the owners/operators at
the time of contamination.8 The individuals filed a motion to dis-
miss, characterizing themselves as "innocent landowners" entitled
to protection from liability.
8 4
Defendant McCarty's Inc. was formed by Samuel McCarty. He
later devised stock to his children S.R., William, and Richard.8 5
William and S.R. McCarty operated the scrapyard during the pe-
riod in which the PCBs were disposed of.8" Richard's affidavit es-
tablished that he was a nominal shareholder and that he had no
real duties in relation to the scrapyard.8 McCarty's subsequently
sold a portion of the scrapyard property to Pacific Hide.88
Upon S.R.'s death, his wife Danya inherited his shares.8 9 Al-
though she assumed the position of "secretary" of the corporation,
the court concluded that she had no knowledge of the
contamination."
William McCarty eventually made a gift of one share each of
McCarty's stock to his children Terry, Sherry and Michael.9 1 The
corporation then forfeited its charter and transferred its assets to
the shareholders (William; Dayna; Richard; Terry; Sherry;
Michael) in return for redemption of their shares.2 Affidavits of
Terry, Sherry and Michael indicated that they had no real involve-
ment in the running of McCarty's.
Addressing liability under the "current owner or operator" pro-
vision, the court concluded that as William was not a current
owner, liability could not be imposed upon him based upon this
provision.93 In contrast, Richard, Dayna, Terry, Sherry and
Michael were current owners.94 The court imposed a burden of
proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that they met those re-
quirements which would have entitled them to the innocent land-
owner defense.9 5 The court summarized the requirements as
follows:
83. Id at 1346.





89. Id at 1344.
90. Id.
91. Id at 1345.
92. Id.





(1) the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the result-
ing damage were caused solely by an act or omission of a third party;
(2) the third party's act of omission did not occur in connection with a con-
tractual relationship (either direct or indirect) with the defendants;
(3) the defendants exercised due care with respect to the hazardous sub-
stance; and
(4) the defendants took precautions against the third party's foreseeable
acts or omissions and the foreseeable consequences resulting therefrom.
9 6
The court then referred to the definition of "contractual relation-
ship" in its entirety. 97 In reference to this definition, the court
stated that the defendants could "get around the contractual rela-
tionship bar if they proved by a preponderance of evidence that at
the time they acquired the facility they did not know and had no
reason to know that PCBs were disposed of on, in, or at the gravel
pit.""8 The court then referred to the definition of "knowledge" as
found in section 9601(35)(B). 9
As to Terry, Sherry and Michael, the court noted that the re-
lease was caused solely by the acts of third parties, rather than by
the defendants and therefore the defendants had no reason to
know of the contamination.100 Furthermore, the court likened re-
ceipt of stock through a gift to receipt through inheritance or be-
quest, 10 1 and noted that the legislative history indicated that the
duty to inquire should be more lenient in regards to inheritances
than in regards to private commercial transactions.1 0 2 The court
also considered that Terry, Sherry and Michael had no "special-
ized knowledge or experience" concerning PCBs.1°0 As a result of
these various factors, the court ultimately concluded that Terry's,
Sherry's and Michael's conduct in regards to making an appropri-
ate inquiry had been sufficient under the circumstances, and found
them not liabile under the current owner prong of liability.
10 4
As to Dayna McCarty, the court took notice of the fact that she
had received her interest through inheritance. 0 5 The court further
noted that she had no "specialized knowledge or experience" that
96. Id at 1346-47.
97. Id at 1347.
98. Id.
99. Id.








would have put her on notice of PCB contamination. 106 Conse-
quently, the court therefore concluded that Dyana was not liable
under the current owner prong of liability.
107
One difficulty in analyzing this case in reference to the inheri-
tance defense is that the court never explicity based the opinion on
it. Indeed, although one of the defendants inherited her interest,
and despite the court's analogy between gifts and inheritances, the
court never quoted the applicable statutory provision.
As to Dayna McCarty, who inherited an ownership interest, the
court did not cite the inheritance defense although the facts
seemed ripe for resolution of the issue on this basis. Rather, the
court referred to the general requirements of the "innocent land-
owner defense." The court analyzed this defendant's liability in re-
gards to any special knowledge and conducting a reasonable in-
quiry. Thus, it is not clear whether the court merely concluded
that those obtaining an interest through inheritance are held to the
same duties as those obtaining land in a different manner, or
whether the court decided the issue on grounds other than the in-
heritance defense. If the former, the court's analysis would seem to
parallel the legislative history and contradict the plain language of
the statute.
Considering for a moment, the issue of the gifts, the court lik-
ened the gifts to inheritances because they did not involve arms-
length transactions.0 8 The court's seeming equation of the inheri-
tance defense with arms-length transactions may appear impru-
dent for it would seem to provide for an extra-statutory means of
escaping liability. For instance, if a landowner wanted to rid him/
herself of contaminated lands, he/she could merely "give" the land
away. The beneficiary would be entitled, under this case, to invoke
the inheritance defense, and the former owner would escape liabil-
ity under the current owner provision. This effectively cuts off the
number of PRPs, and consequently, the potential sources of
cleanup funds. Of course the court would impose the additional
duties of an appropriate inquiry and would consider any special-
ized knowledge on the part of the defendant, although the court in
Pacific Hide has shown this standard to be lax. One may counter
that the inheritance defense itself is a means of cutting off the
106. Id.
107. Id. As to Richard McCarty, the court noted that he neither had a hand in the
operation of the site, nor had he any special knowledge of PCBs. The court consequently
absolved him of liability under the current owner prong of liability.
108. Id at 1348.
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number of PRPs and therefore available funds. This point is con-
ceded, yet this defense was statutorily created-the statute does
not refer to "those receiving property by gift," nor does it absolve
from liability all those receiving property in an other than arms-
length transaction.10 9
Nevertheless, if one assumes that the court disposed of this issue
as if it involved an inheritance, presumably then this court would
hold such a defendant to conduct an appropriate inquiry and
would also consider any "specialized knowledge" on the part of the
defendant as to the contamination. Although this case does not aid
in setting standards for what would constitute an "appropriate in-
quiry," other cases may. 0 For instance, in United States v Mon-
santo"' the court held that the innocent landowner defense does
not sanction "willful or negligent blindness,"1 2 and that such ac-
tions would consequently not satisfy the "inquiry duty."
Furthermore, in Wickland Oil Terminals v Asarco Inc." s the
court held that the defendant had not conducted an appropriate
inquiry and was consequently deprived of the innocent landowner
defense."' The court determined that the defendant-purchaser
was aware of the presence of metal slag piles on the property and
concluded that had the defendant examined all the "available" in-
formation (i.e.-taken test borings and reviewed government docu-
ments relating to the property), it would have been aware of the
environmental problems." 5 The court rejected the defendant's
contentions that its consultants explained that the slag piles did
not present an environmental risk.116
An even stricter duty was announced in Jersey City Develop-
ment Auth v PPG Industries.117 The court determined that, al-
though he was not aware that it was hazardous, the defendant did
know that chromium waste was on the property when he pur-
chased it in 1960. The court held that to lose the innocent land-
109. See note 23 and accompanying text.
110. The following cases address the innocent landowner defense in general rather
than the inheritance defense specifically. Yet given that this court apparently held the de-
fendants to those duties imposed upon others invoking the innocent landowner defense, the
following cases may serve as useful guidelines.
111. 858 F2d 160 (4th Cir 1988).
112. Monsanto, 858 F2d at 169.
113. 654 F Supp 955 (ND Cal 1987).
114. Wickland, 654 F Supp at 955.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 28 Envir L Rptr 1873 (3rd Cir 1988).
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owner defense, one must merely know of the presence of waste, not
whether the waste was hazardous. This was especially significant
given that the 1960's standards would not likely have required a
purchaser to test the waste.
As illustrated above, recent case law is somewhat muddled as to
the scope of the inheritance defense in particular, yet it does help
determine its limits. In Westwood Pharmaceuticals v National
Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation,1 " for example, the court
stated that a party failing to divulge his or her knowledge of con-
tamination would not qualify for the innocent landowner de-
fense.119 Similarly, delay in responding to contamination may re-
sult in a loss of the defense, as illustrated in Shapiro v
Anderson,'" where the landowner was not allowed to use the third
party defense because, inter alia, he waited nearly five years after
discovering the problem before responding.' 2 ' Failure to take pre-
cautions against the foreseeable acts of third parties may also fore-
close reliance upon the third party defense."' Moreover, even mi-
nor contributions to the contamination will prevent a defendant
from successfully asserting the third party defense."' s These cases
do not specifically discuss the inheritance defense, yet they focus
118. 767 F Supp 456, 461 (WD NY 1991).
119. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 767 F Supp at 461. See also, Westwood Phar-
maceuticals v National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation, 1992 WL 44918 (2d Cir NY
1992).
120. 741 F Supp 472, 478 (SD NY 1990).
121. Shapiro, 791 F Supp at 472. In this case the landowner brought an action against
both the county and another co-owner seeking recovery of costs of response to the release
and threatened release of hazardous substances. Id at 475-76. The landowner and co-owner
asserted that they should be protected from liability because they were innocent landown-
ers. Id at 478. The court rejected this argument because not only did the defendants have a
contractual relationship with those responsible for the contamination, but also because
there was a delay in responding to the leachate problem for nearly five years. Id.
122. New York v Shore Realty, 759 F2d 1032, 1048 (2d Cir 1985). In this case the
State of New York commenced an action against the defendants to clean up a hazardous
waste disposal site. Shore Realty, 759 F2d at 1037. Liability was based upon the current
owner provision. The defendant asserted an affirmative defense based upon section
9607(b)(3). The court denied the defendant this haven because, inter alia, it concluded that
the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that certain parties would dump hazardous
waste. Id at 1048-49. The court determined that it could not say that the defendant took
reasonable precautions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of those parties. Id.
123. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v ASARCO, 735 F Supp 358, 363 (WD Wash 1990). Suit
was brought by the government against several parties allegedly responsible for depositing
hazardous waste as a site, and one of those parties brought a thrid party action against
Louisiana-Pacific. The court held that although the vast majority of the contamination was
caused by unrelated third parties, because the waste Louisiana-Pacific delivered contained
minute queantities of hazardous substances, it was precluded from invoking the innocent
landowner defense. ASARCO, 735 F Supp at 363.
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upon those requirements common to any party seeking to invoke
the "innocent landowner defense."
V. CONCLUSION
The precise scope of the inheritance defense is somewhat mud-
dled. The statutory text would require a landowner seeking to in-
voke the inheritance defense to exercise due care and to take pre-
cautions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of third parties
as well as the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions.124 The legislative history would impose the fur-
ther requirement upon the landowner of making a "reasonable in-
quiry" as to the status of the land at the time of acquisition. Ac-
cording to the legislative history, the duty of inquiry would be less
stringent for those obtaining land through inheritance or bequest
than those obtaining land via a commercial transaction. 2 5 More-
over, the legislative history would impose different standards for
those who were unaware of their very inheritance, and for those
who were aware of their inheritance but were unaware as to the
status of the land.' The secondary sources essentially affirm the
position espoused in the legislative history, save the fact that they
fail to make a distinction between those landowners who are either
aware or unaware of their inheritance. 2 7 The case law has not ad-
dressed the defense in any meaningful way and is therefore of little
guidance.
128
The limits of the defense are much clearer than the scope. As
stated above, the landowner will lose the availability of the defense
if he or she owned the property during a period of contamina-
tion, 29 or if he or she failed to react promptly upon discovering the
contamination or threat of contamination. 30 Similarly, if he/she
subsequently transferred the land without disclosing the contami-
nation,' 31 or if he/she failed to take reasonable precautions against
the foreseeable acts of third parties, the affirmative defense would
be forfeited. 32
124. 42 USC § 9607(b)(3).
125. See note 36 and accompanying text.
126. See note 41 and accompanying text.
127. See note 60 and accompanying text.
128. See note 80 and accompanying text.
129. 42 USC § 9601(35)(A).
130. 42 USC § 9607(b)(3).
131. 42 USC § 9601(35)(C).
132. 42 USC § 9607(b)(3).
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What is taxpayer A supposed to do regarding his or her situa-
tion? Presumably A would prefer that this land be economically
beneficial. As it currently stands, the land is a potential liability.
Although there may be no visible leachate, it is nevertheless un-
clear, especially given the historical use of the property, whether
the land is contaminated. If contamination exists, A could poten-
tially be liable under the "current owner or operator" provision of
CERCLA. Obviously, if the land is free from contamination, re-
taining ownership would not translate into a risking of CERCLA
liability-but the mere determination of the status of the land (i.e.
a Phase I inquiry) would likely be expensive. 13  As stated above,
the conducting of a reasonable inquiry is not mandated by statute
and A might seek shelter in the statutory language and thus avoid
making an inquiry.13' Yet given that the legislative history, the sec-
ondary sources, and the case law support his requirement; if A
wanted to retain the land, he/she should probably error on the side
of caution and engage in such an inquiry in order to avoid the risk
of losing the protection of the inheritance defense. Assuming that
the land was retained and that a reasonable inquiry did not reveal
contamination, A would also be held to exercise due caution in the
event that hazardous substances ever were discovered, and to take
precaution against the foreseeable acts or omissions of third par-
ties. 135 By complying with these requirements, A would have ful-
filled the mandates of the statute, the legislative history and sec-
ondary sources and would not likely be deprived of the inheritance
defense if it were ever necessary to invoke.
In an effort to avoid potential liability, A might also consider
selling the land; if the land is sold, then A could not be targeted
for liability under the "current owner or operator" provision. In
the event that A was successful in obtaining a potential buyer, it is
likely that, give today's market, the buyer might require that an
environmental assessment be performed upon the property. Such
an assessment could prove to be extremely dangerous to A. Not
only would it likely result in the loss of the sale if contamination is
discovered, but the buyer may be obligated to report the findings
of contamination to the state environmental agency and/or to the
federal EPA, which in turn might trigger not only cleanup costs,
but litigation costs as well.
133. See note 79 and accompanying text.
134. See note 34 and accompanying text.
135. See note 22 and accompanying text.
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One may attempt to avoid such a potentially disastrous outcome
by securing a buyer willing to purchase the property "as is, where
is." Selling the property without a warranty would circumvent per-
formance of an assessment and would likely result in escaping the
above-mentioned outcomes. The purchase price will likely be lower
than that obtained in a warranty sale, but the loss in purchase
price would presumably be heavily outweighed by potential
cleanup costs. Moreover, if a sale were consummated and contami-
nation was subsequently discovered, A could not be targeted for
liability under the "current owner or operator" provision.
A sale of the land "as is, where is" might not, however, be feasi-
ble, yet retaining the land constitutes a risk. A may still have an
alternative means of avoiding potential CERCLA liability as a cur-
rent owner. For instance, A might consider withholding payment of
taxes in regards to the property. Failure to pay such taxes would
eventually result in a tax sale. In such a sale, the delinquent tax-
payer is usually entitled to that amount of money paid as the
purchase price over and above the amount needed to satisfy the
previously accrued taxes. It is unlikely that contamination would
be discovered in such a sale because there would be no "warranties
of fitness" attached to the land and the government probably
would therefore not engage in any testing which might reveal con-
tamination. Yet such an avenue might not afford A the protection
he/she wants.
Despite the avenue A may choose, he/she should keep in mind
the fact that regardless of the manner or type of sale, if A has
knowledge of contamination and fails to disclose such knowledge
to the purchaser, the inheritance defense would be waived.
The one clear thing about the inheritance defense is that the re-
quirements for invoking the defense are anything but clear. Al-
though increasing concentration upon environmental issues ap-
pears to be on the horizon, the focus will not likely be upon
formulating a clearer definition of the inheritance defense. Rather,
clarification will probably be dependent upon case law. Given the
present paucity of case law on the inheritance defense and given
the somewhat "hidden" existence of the defense (in that it is con-
tained in the "definitions" section of the statute), the much needed
clarification may be a long time in coming.
Carolyn A. Holtschlag
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